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Notes 
WHITEWASHING EXPRESSION: USING COPYRIGHT 




ABSTRACT—Porchlight Music Theatre, a non-equity theatre company in 
Chicago, decided to capitalize on the popularity of Lin-Manuel Miranda’s 
smash hit Hamilton by producing one of Miranda’s earlier works, In the 
Heights. This earlier work tells the story of a predominantly Latinx 
community in New York’s Washington Heights neighborhood. Porchlight’s 
production, however, received significant negative attention when it was 
revealed that the lead character—Usnavi, an immigrant from the Dominican 
Republic—would be played by a white actor. While casting white actors in 
nonwhite roles is nothing new and has been a persistent (and persistently 
criticized) practice in both theatre and film, the casting for In the Heights 
struck a nerve. This particular production incensed the Chicago theatre 
community because of the importance of racial identity to the story. In the 
Heights focuses on the lives of immigrant families and their daily struggles 
with the gentrification of their neighborhood. Casting a white actor in the 
lead role in such a story elicited a significant backlash. 
This Note examines the damage done to authorial intent when the racial 
identity of casting undermines key elements of the author’s expression, and 
proposes that the existing tools of U.S. copyright law may provide a solution. 
Current production licensing and casting practices do not afford adequate 
protection of authorial intent regarding key character traits such as racial or 
gender identity. Consequently, this Note urges an incorporation of the moral 
rights concept of the right of integrity into the current copyright framework 
through an expansion of derivative rights protections. By focusing on when 
character identity elements are central to the expression of the author, these 
extensions of existing law will allow playwrights to protect the integrity of 
their work in subsequent productions without unduly inhibiting the artistic 
expression of the theatre companies performing the work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the Heights, a musical by Lin-Manuel Miranda and Quiara Alegría 
Hudes, tells the story of first- and second-generation Latinx Americans.1 The 
show is a “slice of life” piece of theatre focusing on a three-day span over 
the Fourth of July and employs many of the typical conventions of musical 
theatre: love stories, disapproving parents, struggles for survival, death, and 
healing. However, beneath this standard musical theatre superstructure, the 
Latinx characters suffer from an undercurrent of alienation. This alienation 
stems from the pride they share in the culture they have developed in their 
predominantly Latinx neighborhood and from a fear of how increasing 
gentrification will alter that culture. In the summer of 2016, Porchlight Music 
Theatre in Chicago announced the cast for its upcoming production of In the 
 
 1 All descriptions of the plot of In the Heights come from LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA & QUIARA 
ALEGRÍA HUDES, IN THE HEIGHTS (2005). 
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Heights.2 In addition to the primarily non-Latinx production team,3 the 
casting of the production garnered significant attention for casting a white 
actor of Italian descent in the lead role of Usnavi, the Dominican narrator of 
the show.4 Despite objections from the authors,5 and accusations within the 
theatre community of mounting a “whitewashed” production,6 Porchlight 
defended its casting decision, claiming that the theatre company took a 
“colorblind” approach when casting its shows.7 
Porchlight’s In the Heights was not the only production this year to 
come under fire for casting white actors in nonwhite roles. In fact, it was not 
even the only production in the Chicago area to draw such criticism. Just a 
few months before Porchlight announced its cast for In the Heights, the 
Marriott Theatre received extensive criticism when it announced its cast list 
for a production of Evita that featured only one Latinx actor.8 Nor was 
Chicago the only theatre market attracting criticism for casting non-Latinx 
actors in choice Latinx roles. Just a few weeks after Porchlight’s production 
of In the Heights ignited significant controversy, Phoenix Theatre Company 
in Arizona announced that it would stage a production of the show featuring 
 
 2 Diep Tran, Whitewash ‘In the Heights’? Chicago, You Can Do Better, AMERICAN THEATRE (July 
27, 2016), https://www.americantheatre.org/2016/07/27/whitewash-in-the-heights-chicago-you-can-do-
better [https://perma.cc/D8TZ-ZUAV]. 
 3 Tommy Rivera-Vega, Porchlight’s Whitewashing of In the Heights Narrator is a Letdown for 
Latinx Community, CHICAGO READER (Aug. 3, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/
archives/2016/08/03/porchlights-whitewashing-of-in-the-heights-narrator-is-a-letdown-for-latinx-
community [https://perma.cc/55BJ-XE75] (noting that only the assistant director identified as Latinx). 
 4 Morgan Greene, A White Actor Is Cast in ‘In the Heights,’ Setting Off a Complicated Debate, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 14, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/theater/ct-latino-
casting-porchlight-in-the-heights-ent-0815-20160814-story.html [https://perma.cc/W4KM-YAWA]. 
 5 Tran, supra note 2. Tran quotes the following from her interview with Quiara Alegría Hudes: 
“Casting the roles appropriately is of fundamental importance” because “[f]or decades, the vast majority 
of Latino roles were maids, gangbangers, etc. It’s demoralizing, obnoxious, and reductive of an entire 
people. It’s a lie about who we are, how complicated our dreams and individuality are.” Id. 
 6 See, e.g., id.; Rivera-Vega, supra note 3. 
 7 See Adam Hetrick, Porchlight Artistic Director Responds to In the Heights Casting, PLAYBILL 
(Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.playbill.com/article/porchlist-artistic-director-responds-to-in-the-heights-
casting [https://perma.cc/7QRN-FJYG]. Michael Weber, Porchlight’s artistic director, stated that: “Only 
after offers were made and jobs accepted were the nuances of the artists’ ethnic backgrounds definitively 
revealed through our standard post-hiring PR questionnaires.” Id. 
 8 See, e.g., Morgan Greene, Where Are the Latino Actors? Upcoming ‘Evita’ Sparks Casting 
Criticism, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 17, 2016, 7:00 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
entertainment/theater/news/ct-marriott-evita-terry-james-casting-draws-criticism-20160317-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q2ST-CLE8?type=image]; Kris Vire, Marriott Theatre Faces Criticism Over ‘Evita’ 
Casting, TIMEOUT CHICAGO (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:01 PM), https://www.timeout.com/chicago/blog/marriott-
theatre-faces-criticism-over-evita-casting-031716 [https://perma.cc/JB2J-QTPG]. 
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an Iranian actor as Usnavi.9 While different from the problem of 
whitewashing, Latinx leaders in the local theatre community criticized this 
casting choice for perpetuating the stereotype that “brown is brown.”10 
Moreover, altering racial identity in casting is not confined to theatrical 
productions. Hollywood has a long history of casting white actors to play 
characters of color. In fact, the first feature film with synchronized sound, 
The Jazz Singer, featured the white actor Al Jolson in full blackface.11 While 
Jolson played a white character in the film who only performed in blackface, 
the popularity of the production indicates how well-accepted the practice of 
blackface performance was. Many other cringeworthy casting choices have 
gained infamy over the years, including Mickey Rooney’s cartoonish 
portrayal of the Asian character Mr. Yunioshi in Breakfast at Tiffany’s,12 
Elizabeth Taylor’s turn as the titular Egyptian Queen in Cleopatra,13 and 
Laurence Olivier’s revival of blackface in a 1965 production of Othello.14 
More recent films such as Aloha,15 The Lone Ranger,16 Prince of Persia,17 
and Ghost in the Shell18 show that whitewashing remains common in casting 
decisions. 
Many critiques of whitewashing coming from legal academics have 
focused on the harm the practice does to actors of color and, consequently, 
many propose solutions from employment discrimination law, particularly 
 
 9 Kerry Lengel, ‘In the Heights’ Casting Controversy Comes to Phoenix, AZ CENTRAL (Aug. 19, 
2016, 9:33 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/entertainment/arts/2016/08/19/phoenix-theatre-in-the-
heights-casting/88877340 [https://perma.cc/CED5-HDMP]. 
 10 Id. Ricky Araiza, the artistic director of Teatro Bravo, criticized the casting, saying: 
There is an artist of color who is not Latino being cast in a part of someone who is Latino, which I 
feel can be just as dangerous because to me, as a Latino, that’s saying “brown is brown.” There’s 
white, and then there’s “the ethnics.” As long as it’s someone who’s brown in this part, that’s filling 
the role. That’s how it reads to me. 
Id. 
 11 THE JAZZ SINGER (Warner Bros. 1927). 
 12 BREAKFAST AT TIFFANY’S (Paramount Pictures 1961). 
 13 CLEOPATRA (20th Century Fox 1963). 
 14 OTHELLO (Warner Bros. 1965). 
 15 ALOHA (Columbia Pictures 2015) (featuring the white actress Emma Stone as a “half-Asian” 
character). 
 16 THE LONE RANGER (Walt Disney Pictures 2013) (starring white actor Johnny Depp as the Native 
American character “Tonto”). 
 17 PRINCE OF PERSIA: THE SANDS OF TIME (Walt Disney Pictures 2010) (starring white actor Jake 
Gyllenhaal as the eponymous Persian prince). 
 18 GHOST IN THE SHELL (Paramount Pictures 2017). The casting of Scarlett Johansson as Major 
Motoko Kusanagi created an internet backlash as fans of the original manga series criticized the studio 
for failing to cast Asian-American actors in the role. Cady Lang, People Use Ghost in the Shell Meme 
Generator to Mock Whitewashing, TIME (Mar. 14, 2017), http://time.com/4701118/ghost-in-the-shell-
whitewashing-memes [https://perma.cc/BG9U-ZBWT]. 
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Title VII.19 However, employment law merely addresses the actor’s 
grievance and ignores the author’s interest in protecting expression 
connected to racial identity. This Note focuses on the impact of 
whitewashing on that intended expression and how U.S. copyright law, as 
applied, fails to adequately protect it. 
Copyright law draws a distinction between the ideas presented in an 
author’s work and the expression of those ideas: ideas are not protected, 
expression is.20 However, U.S. copyright law, with its focus on the pecuniary 
rights of authors, has provided only minimal protection of the “moral rights” 
of authors.21 Some scholars have advocated importing explicit moral rights 
protections into U.S. law to safeguard the “integrity rights” of authors.22 
Incorporating a moral-rights-inspired concept of a right of integrity into the 
existing copyright framework could effectively protect authorial intent even 
when it is expressed through racial identity in casting. This Note proposes 
that courts adopt a limited moral rights theory in the casting context primarily 
by expanding the concept of derivative works recognized under current 
 
 19 See, e.g., Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment Industries: 
Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 495 (2001) (“[A]n authenticity 
justification may be the best justification for directors seeking to discriminate in casting actors of a 
particular race . . . .”); Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and 
Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (arguing that Title VII does not provide an 
adequate legal solution for racial discrimination in casting); William R. Bryant, Note, Justifiable 
Discrimination: The Need for a Statutory Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense for Race 
Discrimination, 33 GA. L. REV. 211, 228 (1998) (“[A] BFOQ [bona fide occupational qualification] for 
race should apply to the practice of hiring an African-American actor to play the role of an African 
American . . . .”). 
 20 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.11[B] (Matthew Bender 
& Co., Inc. rev. ed. 2009) (“Notwithstanding the denial of copyright protection for the facts set forth in a 
factual account, protection attaches to the literal form of expression of an account, assuming it to be 
original . . . .”). 
 21 See infra Section II.C. What actually constitutes a “moral right” of an author varies under different 
legal regimes, but the basic premise is summarized by Professor Mira Sundara Rajan as the idea that 
“harm to the work is, in fact, a form of damage to the author himself.” MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL 
RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 7 (2011). The two most discussed aspects of 
moral rights are the right of attribution, which protects an author’s right to ensure that her work is properly 
connected to her name, and the right of integrity, which protects the work itself from “distortion, 
modification, or mutilation.” Id. at 12. 
 22 See, e.g., Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United States and the 
United Kingdom: Challenges and Opportunities under the U.K.’s New Performances Regulations, 
24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213 (2006) (recommending that the United States adopt certain aspects of moral rights 
law from the United Kingdom’s moral rights scheme); Otto W. Konrad, A Federal Recognition of 
Performance Art Author Moral Rights, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1579 (1991) (advocating a “labeling” 
remedy for moral rights infringements); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an 
American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985) (noting some of the failures of copyright law 
to protect the personal rights of authors and advocating a more robust adoption of moral rights). 
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copyright law.23 Such a step would further protect authorial expression 
without unduly burdening subsequent performances. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the role of race and 
casting in theatrical productions and outlines the potential problems with 
current casting practices. Part II examines the limited role that copyright law 
has played in protecting authorial control over casting and the inadequacy of 
employment law and contract law to provide adequate solutions. It then 
provides a brief overview of moral rights theory. Part III proposes that the 
United States incorporate the moral rights concept of a right of integrity into 
existing intellectual property law to allow playwrights to control racial 
identity in casting when racial identity is central to the author’s intended 
expression. Lastly, Part IV addresses potential objections to allowing 
playwrights to exercise a more extensive role in protecting casting, including 
enforceability and First Amendment concerns. 
I. CASTING PRACTICES 
This Part provides a quick overview of the often antagonistic 
relationship between race and casting to underscore how racial identity can 
affect authorial expression, and why it is important to allow authors to 
protect that identity in the casting of subsequent productions. By examining 
both the historical disconnect between characters of color and actors of color, 
and reviewing how current casting practices have failed to remedy this 
disconnect, this Part establishes why a right of integrity to protect racial 
identity in casting is needed. 
A. A Brief History of Race in Casting 
Professor Harvey Young, a leading scholar on theatre and race, has 
written that the concept of the “other” has long pervaded theatrical 
productions. He notes that, for example, even when roles were available to 
actors of color, they tended to be stereotypical depictions focused on 
alienating the character from those around him.24 Even the earliest dramatic 
scripts existing in Western culture, the comedies and tragedies of ancient 
Greece, strategically use the “otherness” of certain characters to impart a 
message to the audience.25 
 
 23 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012). 
 24 HARVEY YOUNG, THEATRE & RACE 17–25 (2013). Professor Young does not believe this 
identification of characters of color as “other” is a thing of the past. Rather, it remains a dominant 
treatment of diverse characters. Id. 
 25 Id. at 17 (“[T]he fascination with looking at people who are deemed ‘other,’ different, and 
problematic appears in the earliest dramatic texts.”); see also, e.g., EURIPIDES, THE BACCHAE (the 
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Similarly, some of Shakespeare’s most enduring characters were 
identified primarily by their otherness: Othello, the Moorish soldier trying to 
gain a reputation in a conquered land;26 Shylock, the Jewish moneylender 
ostracized by the Christian Venetian society that depended on his trade to 
finance the city;27 and Caliban, the “monstrous” native inhabitant of 
Prospero’s island whose unexplained rage drives much of the action of 
Shakespeare’s final play.28 All portrayed something outside the everyday 
world inhabited by Elizabethan audiences. 
However, while the characters were designed to stand out as “the other” 
in the minds of the audience, they would have primarily been played by 
actors who were racially, culturally, and religiously identical to their 
audience. Racially heterogeneous characters were played by racially 
homogenous actors. Young men played women, old men played young men, 
and, by the time a theatrical tradition developed in the United States, white 
actors played characters of all different races.29 The development of 
blackface, redface, and yellowface on American stages produced scenes of 
racially stereotyped performers that would shock modern-day audiences.30 
These types of blatantly racist casting practices began to dissipate in 
part due to the emergence of nontraditional casting in the 1950s.31 After 
World War II, some theatre practitioners sought to increase diversity by 
encouraging playwrights to tell stories centered around characters of color.32 
At roughly the same time, other theatre companies, such as the New York 
Shakespeare Festival, sought to bring actors of color onto their stages 
immediately in part by casting diverse actors in roles previously played by 
white actors.33 The concept of nontraditional or “colorblind” casting began 
with works in the public domain like the Shakespearean canon and the 
tragedies and comedies of classical Greece.34 Because these works had long 
 
outsider is revealed to be the god Dionysus, sent to bring vengeance upon the sacrilegious city officials); 
SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS REX (the outsider who becomes king which leads to the downfall of the city). 
 26 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO. 
 27 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE. 
 28 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST. 
 29 See YOUNG, supra note 24, at 36–56. 
 30 Id. 
 31 ANGELA C. PAO, NO SAFE SPACES: RE-CASTING RACE, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALITY IN 
AMERICAN THEATER 3 (2010). The term “nontraditional casting,” which refers to the casting of actors of 
color in traditionally white roles, however, did not become commonplace until the 1980s. Id. 
 32 See BRANDI WILKINS CATANESE, THE PROBLEM OF THE COLOR[BLIND]: RACIAL TRANSGRESSION 
AND THE POLITICS OF BLACK PERFORMANCE 33 (2011) (alteration in original) (describing the playwright 
August Wilson’s disdain for colorblind casting). 
 33 PAO, supra note 31, at 3. 
 34 See id. at 3–4. 
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since passed beyond the control of their authors, colorblind casting in 
productions did not implicate any concerns regarding authorial intent. As 
these diverse productions became more popular and accepted, the practice of 
colorblind casting gradually spread, and companies began employing 
nontraditional casting. The contemporary casting practices discussed below 
still rely in large part on colorblind casting, which was itself a reaction to 
overt racism in casting. 
B. Current Casting Practices 
While the brief account above introduces the negative historical 
connotations associated with race and casting, an overview of the current 
production licensing process highlights the ongoing need for protecting 
racial identity in casting. Playwrights typically work with either a publishing 
house or an agent to license their scripts.35 A theatre company performing an 
author’s work must first secure the rights to the work by applying for a public 
performance license from the publishing house or agent.36 Once the license 
is granted, the company must obtain written permission prior to making 
certain alterations to the script.37 Prohibited alterations include cutting out 
profanity, combining characters, and even changing the gender of the 
character.38 Conspicuously absent from this list is the racial identity of the 
character. 
However, even though the racial identity of a particular character is not 
on the standard list of prohibited alterations made available by prominent 
publishing houses such as Samuel French, there is some evidence that 
playwrights consider this element of their characters to be protectable 
expression. For example, the president of the playwrights’ union, the 
Dramatists Guild, issued a public letter on November 18, 2015, declaring the 
union’s position that the racial identity of characters is protectable as part of 
the “stage directions” of the copyrighted work.39 While the union believed 
 
 35 Telephone Interview with Harvey Young, Chair of Theatre, Northwestern University (Oct. 14, 
2016). 
 36 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (granting copyright holders the exclusive right “in the case 
of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly” (emphasis added)). 
 37 Frequently Asked Questions, SAMUEL FRENCH, http://www.samuelfrench.com/faq#script1 
[https://perma.cc/XA5J-CPYU]. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Tracey Paleo, Dramatists Guild President on Writer’s Rights, FOOTLIGHTS (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://footlights.click/2015/11/18/dramatists-guild-president-on-writers-rights [https://perma.cc/2AFT= 
FHR4] (“Casting is an implicit part of the stage directions; to pretend otherwise is disingenuous.”). Doug 
Wright, the president, stated further that: 
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that such protections already existed, the current casting process indicates 
that this belief was unfounded. 
Today, the debate on nontraditional casting centers principally around 
whether “colorblind” casting or “color-conscious” casting better serves the 
theatrical community.40 Colorblind casting focuses on casting “the most 
skilled performer for each part,” regardless of race.41 Proponents of 
colorblind casting typically focus on the employment opportunities it 
provides to actors of color.42 However, critics point to the homogenizing 
effects of this casting practice and argue that a focus on “color-conscious” 
casting instead would provide the same employment benefits for actors 
without negatively reinforcing the concept of white hegemony.43 Both sides 
of this debate focus on the effect casting methods have on employment 
opportunities and only look at the author’s expressive intent as a marginal 
concern. 
This scholarly concern about the effects casting practices have on actors 
is well-founded. Whitewashing is nothing new, and actors of color have long 
felt the brunt of lost opportunities. As an illustration, one of the more 
infamous instances of theatrical whitewashing occurred when the British 
producers of Miss Saigon attempted to open a Broadway production of the 
West End hit.44 The London-based producer, Cameron Mackintosh, wanted 
to bring the show to New York and announced his intention to keep the well-
known actor Jonathan Pryce in the role of the Engineer.45 However, Pryce 
was a white British actor, while the Engineer was a Eurasian brothel owner.46 
 
Directors who wish to dramatically reimagine material can choose from work in the public domain. 
But when a play is still under copyright, directors must seek permission if they are going to make 
changes to the play, including casting a character outside his or her obvious race, gender or implicit 
characteristics. To do so without meaningful consultation with the writer is both a moral and a legal 
breach. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 40 YOUNG, supra note 24, at 56–63. 
 41 Id. at 56. 
 42 See, e.g., id. at 58 (“For the actor, the draw of colorblind casting practices is that hiring decisions 
are premised on talent and not whether a person possesses the ‘right look.’ The benefits of a colorblind 
theatre are difficult to ignore.”). 
 43 See, e.g., CATANESE, supra note 32, at 35 (“In the color-blind future, therefore, blacks and other 
minority groups will experience drastically different lives, having been liberated from racial concerns, 
but whites, presumably, will step unaltered into a postracial America.”). 
 44 See Lois L. Krieger, Note, “Miss Saigon” and Missed Opportunity: Artistic Freedom, Employment 
Discrimination, and Casting for Cultural Identity in the Theater, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 839 (1992); see 
also Mabel Ng, Note, Miss Saigon: Casting for Equality on an Unequal Stage, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 451 (1992). 
 45 Krieger, supra note 44, at 841. 
 46 Id. 
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After receiving complaints from many of its Asian-American members, 
Actors Equity Association, the stage actors union in the United States, 
announced that it would not permit Pryce to perform the role in the 
Broadway production.47 
In response to Equity’s decision, Mackintosh decided to shut down the 
entire Broadway production.48 Because closing the show would have resulted 
in the loss of numerous other Asian-American roles in a Broadway show, 
Equity received protests and complaints from its members and promptly 
reversed its decision to disallow Pryce’s performance.49 While Mackintosh 
did eventually mount the Broadway production, the incident sparked a 
rethinking of racial politics in casting and led to vocal opposition to theatrical 
whitewashing.50 
However, because it was the actors and their union objecting to Pryce’s 
appearance in Miss Saigon, instead of the author, little thought was given to 
authorial intent in addressing the casting decision. As the number of 
playwrights of color has risen, the number of playwrights telling stories that 
center around race has also grown; it is therefore time to look beyond the 
impact of whitewashing on actors of color and to explore the effect it has on 
the author’s intended expression. Unfortunately, the current legal system 
offers few solutions. 
II. COPYRIGHT AND MORAL RIGHTS 
The current copyright structure in the United States offers few formal 
moral rights protections.51 However, Congress has declined to pass 
legislation recognizing moral rights in artistic work, claiming that existing 
copyright law provides the requisite protections.52 In light of this apparent 
contradiction, it is necessary to understand which areas of copyright law 
Congress believes provide sufficient moral rights protections. It is also 
necessary to understand the judiciary’s reluctance to protect the right of 
integrity in casting to fully appreciate the solution this Note proposes. This 
 
 47 Id. Equity had this authority based on its contractual power to restrict international actors from 
performing on American stages. See Ng, supra note 44, at 458. However, that power was limited to 
deciding whether the international actor seeking employment was deemed an international “star,” and 
thus exempt from Equity’s prohibitions. Id. at 455. Complicating matters was an earlier Equity decision 
granting Pryce “star” status, which prevented Equity from denying such status for the Miss Saigon 
production. Id. at 456. 
 48 Ng, supra note 44, at 456. 
 49 Id. at 457. 
 50 Krieger, supra note 44, at 843–44. 
 51 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 52 See infra Section II.C. 
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Part begins with an overview of the justifications for U.S. copyright law 
before moving on to an examination of the tools currently available for 
playwrights to protect their expression in subsequent casting. Finally, this 
Part provides a brief overview of moral rights theory and the limited extent 
to which moral rights have been recognized in U.S. law. 
A. Utilitarian Justifications for Copyright 
Utilitarian, incentive-based justifications dominate U.S. copyright law 
theory.53 This is evident in the Constitution itself, which provides the basis 
for U.S. copyright law by giving Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”54 The constitutional text thus authorizes Congress to provide 
copyright protection to increase the amount of scientific and “useful” arts 
available to the public. Additionally, the current version of the Copyright Act 
goes to great lengths to describe the economic benefits granted to the 
copyright holder.55 
Indeed, the consensus view among judges and scholars alike is that the 
current role played by copyright law in the U.S. legal system is to encourage 
the creation of artistic works.56 Adherents to the utilitarian view argue that 
without a guarantee of economic protection, artists will not invest the time 
 
 53 See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 20, at § 1.03[A] (explaining the utilitarian underpinnings 
of copyright law).  
 54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 55 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). Section 106 grants copyright holders the exclusive rights: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work . . . [and] 
. . . . 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works . . . to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly . . . . 
Id. 
 56 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[T]he 
limited grant [of exclusivity through copyright] is . . . intended to motivate the creative activity of authors 
and inventors by the provision of a special reward . . . .”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“[T]he ultimate aim [of copyright law] is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.”); see also 2 MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2016, ch. IV, at 12 (2016) (“American copyright law can thus be seen 
as primarily striving to achieve an optimal balance between fostering incentives for the creation of literary 
and artistic works and the optimal use and dissemination of such works.”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 20, at § 1.03[A] (“[T]he authorization to grant to individual authors the limited monopoly of 
copyright is predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits from the creative activities of 
authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary condition to the full realization of such creative 
activities.”). 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1148 
and labor necessary to produce creative works.57 This economic-based view 
has guided U.S. copyright law since the nation’s founding. 
While utilitarian theory remains the bedrock justification for U.S. 
copyright law, some scholars argue that economic protections do not 
adequately incentivize artistic creation. Professors Jessica Silbey and 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, for example, argue that it is the need to create that 
drives many authors and artists regardless of the uncertainty of economic 
gain.58 They both conducted interviews with artistic creators and each 
described the relationship between the artist and her work as akin to a parent–
child relationship, where the artist feels a responsibility to protect the work 
itself.59 
In light of these criticisms of the actual effectiveness of a utilitarian, 
incentive-based model of copyright, perhaps it is time to rethink what 
function copyright serves in the real world. Do artists create because they 
expect monetary reward for the creation? Even if this is the case, does the 
current structure of our copyright law provide economic benefits to the 
author? Or rather, as Professor Kwall argues, are the true beneficiaries of our 
current system the copyright holders, who tend to be distributors rather than 
creators of artistic work?60 
B. Existing Avenues of Protecting Integrity Rights in Casting 
If we accept Silbey and Kwall’s position that authors desire creative 
control more than economic reward,61 then it follows that a right of integrity 
that allows creators greater control over their work may better serve the 
underlying policies of copyright law.62 Even assuming that utilitarian 
 
 57 See, e.g., LEMLEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 10–11. 
 58 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 17 (2010) (arguing that the creative process is more akin to a spiritual 
undertaking than an economic one); JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND 
EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 53 (2015) (claiming that creators create to express their “identity 
and personality” more than for economic gain). But Kwall has noted elsewhere that “the primary objective 
of our copyright law is to ensure the copyright owner’s receipt of all financial rewards to which he is 
entitled . . . by virtue of ownership.” Kwall, supra note 22, at 2. 
 59 KWALL, supra note 58, at 17 (“[P]ainter Max Ernst has written that ‘[t]he author is present as a 
spectator, indifferent or impassioned, at the birth of his own work.’”); SILBEY, supra note 58, at 52–53. 
 60 Kwall, supra note 22, at 2 (“[T]he primary objective of our copyright law is to ensure the copyright 
owner’s receipt of all financial rewards to which he is entitled . . . by virtue of ownership.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 61 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 62 This assumes that we accept the idea that authorial intent should be protected. Literary theorists 
have long argued over the significance of authorial intent. Postmodernists such as Roland Barthes have 
argued that the meaning of a work is created by the reader’s perception of it and that no fixed authorial 
intent can be derived from the text. See Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author (1967), reprinted in THE 
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motives should drive copyright law,63 providing a benefit that better matches 
what creators value would likely be more effective in incentivizing the 
creation of artistic works. This Section examines the existing protective 
structures under current law that the courts could use to provide some 
measure of creative control in subsequent casting of a production. While 
courts have been reluctant to use these tools to provide moral rights 
protections, they could easily be extended to achieve such goals. 
1. Derivative Works 
The primary potential tool for protecting a right of integrity in casting 
provided by current copyright law may be the exclusive right “to prepare 
derivative works based upon the [original] copyrighted work” protected by 
§ 106(2) of the Copyright Act.64 Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a 
derivative work as: 
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical 
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of 
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as 
a whole, represent an original work of authorship . . . .65 
If courts decided to construe a production that changed the racial 
identity of a character to constitute the creation of a derivative work, then 
perhaps the current law would provide the type of integrity protections 
lacking due to the absence of moral rights. A close reading of the statute does 
potentially provide a textual basis for such an extension because the statutory 
language refers to “other modifications.”66 The current judicial 
understanding of a derivative work, however, does not extend to changes of 
this nature. For example, courts have, in practice, been quite reluctant to 
recognize such a broad understanding of derivative works and instead have 
focused more on traditional understandings of derivative works, such as 
 
DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF THE AUTHOR? 3 (William Irwin ed., 2002). Intentionalist theorists have 
questioned this position and contend that the author’s subjective intent should influence our understanding 
of a work’s meaning. See William Irwin, Intentionalism and Author Constructs, in THE DEATH AND 
RESURRECTION OF THE AUTHOR?, supra at 191. Despite this philosophical disagreement, the law has long 
recognized the importance of the individual author, and this Note follows this long-held understanding. 
 63 See supra Section II.A. 
 64 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
 65 Id. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 66 Id. 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1150 
translations of a foreign language work into English or a dramatization of a 
written literary work.67 
But the idea of extending the concept of derivative works protection to 
include some form of a right integrity is not unprecedented. At least one court 
has considered “transformation” of a copyrighted work to create such a 
substantial change that the result qualified as a derivative work. In Gilliam 
v. American Broadcasting Cos.68 the Second Circuit addressed whether the 
comedy group Monty Python could file suit against ABC to prevent future 
airing of their work after ABC first aired severely edited versions of three 
episodes.69 
Monty Python previously signed a contract with the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), agreeing that the BBC would air the TV 
show Monty Python’s Flying Circus.70 The contract required that the BBC 
receive permission from Monty Python before making changes to the aired 
version, but the agreement also allowed the BBC to “license the transmission 
of recordings of the television programs in any overseas territory.”71 The 
BBC exercised its licensing rights, and Time-Life purchased the rights to 
distribute Flying Circus in the United States.72 Time-Life then proceeded to 
edit three thirty-minute episodes to air during a ninety-minute slot on ABC.73 
The version that aired never received Monty Python’s approval and twenty-
four minutes of the ninety minutes of content had been removed either to 
make room for commercials or due to “offensive or obscene matter” in the 
original.74 
Monty Python claimed that the edits “mutilated” their work and sued to 
prevent ABC from airing any other Flying Circus programs without their 
approval of the final edited version.75 One of the threshold issues the Second 
Circuit examined was whether Monty Python owned the copyright in the 
recorded program.76 Interestingly, the court avoided this question. Monty 
Python contended, and the court agreed, that the copyright of the recorded 
program was irrelevant because the version ABC aired was a derivative work 
 
 67 See Konrad, supra note 22, at 1593 (describing traditional court practices). 
 68 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 69 Id. at 18. 
 70 Id. at 17. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 17–18. 
 73 Id. at 18. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
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based on the original, and, as the creators of the original script, Monty Python 
was entitled to prohibit ABC’s unlicensed derivative work.77 
While the Gilliam decision shows the potential of the derivative works 
doctrine to protect an author’s integrity rights, seemingly no other courts 
have followed the rationale of the Second Circuit, instead choosing to point 
to Monty Python’s contractual agreement with the BBC requiring their 
approval of edits to any aired version of the work.78 Consequently, derivative 
works have so far failed to provide a reliable substitute for the integrity right 
protection afforded by moral rights theory. However, derivative works could 
provide significant integrity rights protections if the courts alter their current 
understanding of what constitutes a derivative work.79 
2. Contractual Options 
Another potential solution to the lack of moral rights protections would 
be to rely on contract law and put the burden on playwrights to include 
restrictive clauses in their licensing agreements that would grant them greater 
control over casting.80 As discussed in Part I, licensing agreements under the 
current casting structure create some obstacles to authorial control over racial 
identity in casting.81 But a more familiar contractual problem faced by 
playwrights is their relative lack of bargaining power. In fact, one 
commentator has argued that “[t]he principal difficulty with the contractual 
analogue is that economic forces compel even the authors of performance art 
to waive their personality rights . . . .”82 
Because playwrights are often unknown at the time they make their 
work publicly available through licensing, they do not typically have the 
bargaining power or sophistication to protect interests such as the “integrity” 
 
 77 Id. at 19–20. 
 78 See Konrad, supra note 22, at 1593 (“[I]n the fifteen years since the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit issued the Gilliam opinion, no other court ever has used Gilliam to redress 
personality rights violations.”). 
 79 See infra Section III.A.2. Such an expansive interpretation of the derivative works right is well 
within the realm of possibility. Professor Jessica Litman for example, in arguing against what she sees as 
far too expansive copyright protections in the digital age, writes that under the language of the statute 
itself, “current law may make it technically illegal to watch a movie and then imagine what it would have 
looked like if the studio had cast some other actor in the leading role,” as this would constitute a derivative 
work. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 80 See Konrad, supra note 22, at 1586 (“In general, of all artists, performance art authors have the 
closest approximation to a contractual form of moral rights when they contract with interpretive artists 
and producers.”). 
 81 See supra Section I.B. 
 82 See Konrad, supra note 22, at 1587. 
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of their work.83 Because playwrights typically only make money through 
licensing public performances of their work (compared to, for example, a 
novelist who typically is compensated based on the distribution of her work), 
they have almost no leverage when entering into a licensing agreement. 
Bargaining inequality becomes even more apparent when one considers 
which playwrights have successfully employed licensing protection for 
subsequent casting. Typically, strong authorial control of casting has only 
been exercised by playwrights (or their estates) with sufficient resources and 
name recognition to grant them a strong bargaining position. For example, 
both the Gershwin Estate and the Beckett Estate have successfully shut down 
productions failing to comply with the casting desires of the author.84 The 
Gershwin Estate stipulates in licenses for “certain performances” of Porgy 
and Bess that black characters must be played by black actors.85 The Beckett 
Estate is also well-known for imposing stringent licensing requirements, not 
only preventing any alteration to the script or setting of Beckett’s plays, but 
also strictly controlling casting of subsequent productions, including the race 
and gender of the actors.86 However, these estates are the exception rather 
than the rule because the stature and success of those playwrights provided 
them with much greater bargaining power than that possessed by the typical 
playwright. 
An additional problem of relying on licensing is that it can give the 
playwright too much control over casting. For example, the Gershwin and 
Beckett Estates do not necessarily use licensing to dictate casting only when 
racial or gender identity of the actor is central to the expression of the author. 
 
 83 See id. (“[T]he entrepreneurs of the performance art industry have a decided bargaining advantage 
that performance art authors find hard to counter.”). Konrad explains: “Even if a performance art author 
manages to secure contractual provisions protecting his personality interests, the author still faces the 
difficulty of protecting his personality interests from the virtually unlimited number of wrongful acts 
falling outside the specific terms of the contract.” Id. at 1587–88. 
 84 See KWALL, supra note 58, at 45 (describing actions taken by the Beckett Estate to control casting); 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, and Unfair 
Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 325–27 (2006) (describing the successful efforts of the Gershwin Estate to 
control casting). 
 85 Arewa, supra note 84, at 325–26; see also Gershwin v. Whole Thing Co., No. CV 80-569 TJH 
(Px), 1980 WL 1182, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1980) (“[W]hen Mr. Gershwin licenses the full grand 
musical play ‘Porgy and Bess,’ he demands that each performance meet a number of requirements. One 
such requirement is that the play be performed by a Black cast and a Black chorus. The reason for this is 
quite simple. George and Ira Gershwin created ‘Porgy and Bess’ to be a musical play about Southern 
Blacks.”). 
 86 See KWALL, supra note 58, at 45. However, the Beckett Estate has experienced various levels of 
success in asserting moral rights protections to control casting in subsequent productions outside of the 
United States. Id. (noting that while the Beckett Estate was successful in stopping an all-female 
production of Waiting for Godot in France, it failed to prevent other productions in the Netherlands). 
 
112:1137 (2018) Whitewashing Expression 
1153 
Because playwrights can contract freely, they may insist upon exacting 
control over many aspects of future productions. This often results in a more 
oppressive effect on casting than would the approach this Note advocates for 
in Part III, which would be limited to situations where racial identity is 
central to the author’s expression.87 
C. Moral Rights and U.S. Copyright Law 
In light of the emphasis that U.S. copyright law places on the pecuniary 
interests of artists and creators, it is unsurprising that moral rights have not 
been widely adopted.88 Other parts of the world, however, have recognized 
moral rights for well over a century. The Berne Convention, drafted in 1886, 
provides some form of moral rights protections to artists in the 175 countries 
that have ratified it.89 Of this panoply of rights, the two most important have 
been the right of attribution and the right of integrity, which are guaranteed 
in Article 6bis of the document.90 This Note focuses primarily on the right of 
integrity, which Professor Kwall describes as a “guarantee[] that the author’s 
work truly represents her creative personality, and is free of distortions that 
misrepresent her creative expression.”91 As discussed below, a legislative 
adoption of the moral rights concept of the right of integrity could be the 
most effective way to allow playwrights to prevent productions of their work 
with a cast that violates the essential expression of the work.92 
Congress, however, has been quite reluctant to extend moral rights 
protection to authors, even after international commerce concerns convinced 
Congress to sign on to the Berne Convention. In 1994, Congress signed the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
 87 For a discussion of what makes the racial identity central to the expression of the author, see infra 
Part III. 
 88 See KWALL, supra note 58, at 25–26 (“Copyright law in the United States fails to afford authors, 
in an explicit fashion, comprehensive moral rights such as the right to have their works attributed to them 
or the right to have their works maintained and presented in a manner consistent with their artistic 
vision.”). 
 89 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, 
828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The relevant text of Article 6bis reads: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the 
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation 
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 
Id. For a list of countries that have ratified the Berne Convention, see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15  
[https://perma.cc/47AV-37SU]. 
 90 Berne Convention, supra note 89. 
 91 KWALL, supra note 58, at 5–6. 
 92 See infra Section III.A.1. 
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(TRIPS), which incorporated much of the Berne Convention.93 But Congress 
explicitly excluded adoption of Article 6bis.94 Congress had the ability to do 
this because “the means of redress for safeguarding the Article 6bis rights 
‘shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is 
claimed.’ That clause gives each member state significant leeway in the 
implementation of moral rights.”95 
So far Congress has done little to ensure that moral rights are protected 
at the level contemplated by the Berne Convention. This congressional 
inaction seems to be due in large part to the belief that existing intellectual 
property laws provide adequate protection for the rights granted by Article 
6bis.96 Despite these congressional contentions that copyright law adequately 
protected an author’s moral rights at the time of the treaty’s adoption, 
Congress has since taken some small steps toward more significant moral 
rights protections. The most concrete example of this is the passage of the 
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA),97 which allows the “author of a 
work of visual art”98 several exclusive rights not otherwise granted by the 
Copyright Act.99 Additionally, VARA follows the moral rights tradition of 
 
 93 KWALL, supra note 58, at 37. 
 94 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
81 (1994). 
 95 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01[B] (Matthew Bender 
& Co., Inc. rev. ed. 2009) (quoting Berne Convention, supra note 89). 
 96 H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917 (“While some [expert 
witnesses] argued that adherence to [Article 6bis of] Berne required the enactment of new laws, the vast 
majority of those using adherence contended that existing laws, both Federal and State, statutory and 
common, were sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Convention.”); see also Amy L. Landers, 
The Current State of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Artists in the United States, 15 HASTINGS COMM. 
& ENT. L.J. 165, 173 n.55 (1992) (“Congress, however, has determined that U.S. law prior to the Act 
complied with Berne requirements and that the Act merely brought U.S. law into greater harmony with 
laws of other Berne countries.” (internal quotations marks omitted)). 
 97 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 98 A “work of visual art” is limited to: “a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single 
copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the 
author” or a similarly limited “still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only . . . .” 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 99 The author of a work of visual art: 
(1) shall have the right— 
(A) to claim authorship of [the] work . . . 
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she 
did not create; 
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual 
art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and 
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), [the author] shall have the right— 
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allowing the author to retain integrity and attribution rights regardless of 
whether the author holds the copyright to the work.100 By adding explicit 
protections for a visual artist’s right of integrity through VARA, Congress 
implicitly acknowledged that the current copyright structure does not 
adequately protect moral rights; however, Congress has not taken additional 
steps to expand these types of protections to authors outside the visual arts. 
Given the extremely limited protections provided by VARA and the 
failure to extend moral rights protections to other areas of copyright law, it 
is unlikely that Congress will provide a legislative solution to protect racial 
identity in casting any time soon. In light of this difficulty, we next ask: What 
legal avenue would provide playwrights with the appropriate level of 
protections? Part III takes up this question and proposes a judicially created 
solution. 
III. APPLICATION OF A RIGHT OF INTEGRITY IN CASTING 
If we accept that authorial intent is worth protecting, the question 
becomes: What methods can provide the best form of that protection? In the 
context of color-conscious casting, adopting the moral rights concept of the 
right of integrity could serve as a useful tool for playwrights. The application 
of the integrity right, however, should be confined to those situations where 
the racial identity of the character is central to the expression of the 
playwright. For an initial, concrete example of how moral rights theory 
might operate in the real world, recall the story of Porchlight’s production of 
In the Heights that began this Note. In the context of a play dealing with the 
difficulties of assimilation as an immigrant, a strong argument can be made 
that the racial identity of characters is central to expressing authorial intent 
because of the struggle Latinx communities to preserve aspects of their 
cultures in the face of gentrification. If the authors of In the Heights felt that 
the production had violated their intent, under a moral rights theory, they 
would have actionable rights against the production. This Note next 
examines what such an action might look like with and without legislative 
approval, and which remedies would best protect authorial expression in 
casting. 
 
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which 
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, and 
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly 
negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right. 
Id. § 106A. 
 100 Id. (“Only the author of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that 
work, whether or not the author is the copyright owner.” (emphasis added)). 
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A. Implementation 
The central question this Note examines is what steps could or should 
be taken to implement a right of integrity into U.S. copyright law in a way 
that will adequately protect a playwright’s expression in subsequent casting 
of a production. One possibility is for Congress to provide explicit statutory 
protections. This is unlikely in light of congressional refusal to adopt the 
moral rights provisions of the Berne Convention.101 However, other 
legislative actions such as the passage of VARA, which recognized at least 
a limited right of attribution in visual art, may indicate an opening through 
which additional moral rights protections could be recognized.102 
Alternatively, the judiciary could expand protections provided in the 
current legal structure. To date, the judiciary has been reluctant to provide 
moral rights protections beyond those explicitly granted by VARA.103 
However, Congress’s repeated assertions that current copyright law already 
provides adequate moral rights protections offer some support for judicial 
implementation of moral rights even without new legislation.104 Therefore, 
although judicial recognition of a right of integrity would require a change 
in the current jurisprudence, such a shift is more likely to prove a viable path 
to providing right of integrity protection to racial identity in casting than 
relying on congressional action. 
The next two Sections examine implementation of moral rights through 
both the legislature and the judiciary, including recommendations for an 
appropriate remedial structure. 
1. Legislative Implementation 
The most secure way to provide legal protection of a right of integrity 
in casting would be for Congress to create statutory protections. While 
Congress has made small steps toward recognition of some moral rights in 
limited circumstances,105 the overall tenor of the legislature remains as 
hostile toward full moral rights recognition as it was when Congress adopted 
the Berne Convention without moral rights protections.106 This hostility 
appears to stem in part from Congress’s belief that current U.S. intellectual 
property law provides adequate tools for protecting traditional moral rights 
 
 101 See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. 
 102 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 103 See supra Section II.B.1. 
 104 See supra Section II.C. 
 105 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (extending limited rights of authorship and integrity only to works of visual 
art). 
 106 See supra Section II.C. 
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concerns. However, as discussed above, these tools fail to provide sufficient 
protection to the particular problem of racial identity in casting.107 This 
inadequacy suggests that Congress may simply be uninterested in filling gaps 
in existing law and providing a firm protection for a right of integrity. 
Finally, even if Congress were to act, any resulting legislation designed 
to protect a right of integrity would not likely address the specific problem 
of racial identity in casting. Under such a statutory scheme, courts would still 
have to examine the context of each case to determine whether the character 
identity at issue was truly central to the expression of the author.  
2. Judicial Implementation 
In light of the difficulties apparent in providing a legislative solution, 
perhaps a more effective alternative would be for the judiciary to take 
Congress at its word and use existing intellectual property laws to protect 
moral rights. However, this would require a significant change in how the 
courts currently view copyright protections. 
While federal courts have occasionally made passing references to 
moral rights protections, they have not recognized a legal cause of action for 
right of integrity protections.108 Given the Supreme Court’s growing hostility 
to the creation of implied rights of action,109 it is highly unlikely that the 
judiciary will find any such implication for a separate moral rights cause of 
action. However, a more author-friendly interpretation of existing copyright 
protections may allow courts to begin addressing issues of identity in casting 
even under the current legal framework. Additionally, such an interpretation 
of existing law would seem to comply with Congress’s understanding of the 
legislative scheme. 
When Congress adopted large parts of the Berne Convention into U.S. 
law, it explicitly excluded the moral rights provisions of Article 6bis on the 
grounds that current intellectual property laws provided sufficient 
protections for moral rights concepts.110 Considering this express 
congressional understanding of the current legal framework, the judiciary 
could begin to expand copyright protections by, for example, extending the 
 
 107 See supra note 99; see also supra Section II.B. 
 108 See supra Section II.B.1. 
 109 See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007) (declining to recognize an implied right 
of action under the Fifth Amendment even in the absence of adequate alternative remedies because 
“Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation” 
(citation omitted)); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378–80 (1983) (holding that the existing legislative 
scheme for protecting First Amendment rights in employment disputes counseled against recognizing an 
implied right of action). 
 110 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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concept of derivative rights protections to include subsequent productions of 
performances when casting has fundamentally changed the expressive intent 
of the author. 
Expanding the understanding of a derivative work to include a 
subsequent performance of a copyrighted play in which the casting of the 
production altered a fundamental component of the author’s central 
expressive intent could provide relief for playwrights even absent 
congressional action. Congress has stated that it believes the current 
copyright system in the United States provides sufficient protections for 
moral rights.111 It is hard to imagine where else in current copyright law a 
right of integrity could exist if not within the protections for derivative rights. 
But expanding derivative rights protection to cover something akin to a right 
of integrity in characters’ racial identity would require courts to overrule 
prior precedent and significantly change how they view the scope of the 
derivative right.112 
The court in Gilliam came close to recognizing an implicit right of 
integrity in an author’s right to control derivative works.113 However, 
subsequent case law consistently distinguished Gilliam, pointing to the 
unique contractual provisions involved in the case. Adopting Gilliam’s 
reasoning and expanding derivative rights to include situations in which the 
casting of a production has altered part of the original author’s central 
expression is an appropriate step to provide limited moral rights protections 
in U.S. copyright law. 
Even if the courts were to adopt this more expansive view of derivative 
works, licensing agreements could be drafted to simply include a license to 
create a derivative work and thus frustrate authors’ integrity rights. Because 
the typical playwright would need the revenue from licensing fees, she would 
still be in the same disadvantaged bargaining position114 and would likely 
have little choice but to agree to a derivative works license as well. 
Notwithstanding this entrenched bargaining imbalance, however, a judicial 
recognition that changing racial identity in casting may constitute a 
derivative work could still improve the current legal structure in two ways. 
First, legal recognition that altering the racial identity of a character 
may create a derivative work would make retaining racial identity the default 
 
 111 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 112 See supra Section II.B.1. 
 113 Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos. 538 F.2d 14, 19–20 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 114 See supra Section II.B.2. 
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bargaining position under which negotiations take place.115 Additionally, 
requiring a production to acknowledge that it has changed the racial identity 
of certain characters in a way that transforms authorial intent may encourage 
those seeking to license a performance of the production to cast the show in 
accordance with the author’s intent in an attempt to avoid negative publicity. 
Second, the need to negotiate for an additional license beyond just the 
standard public performance license may allow playwrights to extract 
additional revenue. This monetary gain may be inadequate if what the 
playwright desires is control over a work’s integrity.116 However, requiring 
an additional derivative works license would at least be a financial 
recognition of the value of control, the loss of which must be compensated. 
Thus, a judicial solution would require a shift in current derivative 
works jurisprudence and would not necessarily resolve the problems created 
by the inequitable bargaining positions held by relatively unknown 
playwrights. Nevertheless, it would at least create a baseline understanding 
within licensing negotiations that a character’s racial (and gender) identity 
should be taken into account by theatre companies seeking to mount a public 
production. 
B. Remedies 
Regardless of whether right of integrity protections are established by 
the legislature or are crafted by the judiciary, such rights also require 
appropriate remedies. Three remedial paradigms typically recur in moral 
rights discussions: labeling remedies, monetary damages, and injunctions.117 
First, a labeling remedy could allow an author of a copyrighted work to 
prohibit a public display, including a public performance, of the work from 
using the author’s name in connection which the display when she feels it no 
longer represents her expressive intent.118 However, a labeling remedy 
principally protects attribution rights rather than integrity rights because a 
labelling remedy would not stop the production from proceeding. If the goal 
is to protect the expressive intent of the author, merely removing the author’s 
name will not suffice. While such a remedy may prevent reputational damage 
 
 115 See KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF 
DIGITAL SAMPLING 128 (2011) (“[L]icensing negotiations always take place in the shadow of copyright 
law’s provisions—and the ways that courts have interpreted those provisions in particular cases.”). 
 116 See supra Section II.A. 
 117 Phyllis Amarnick, American Recognition of the Moral Right: Issues and Options, 29 COPYRIGHT 
L. SYMP. 31, 51–52 (1979); see also Konrad, supra note 22, at 1613. 
 118 See Amarnick, supra note 117, at 52. Some commentators believe that labeling remedies provide 
adequate protection for dramatic authors without interfering with the First Amendment rights of theatre 
companies performing the work. See, e.g., Konrad, supra note 22, at 1618–20. 
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to the author because she will no longer be associated with the production, 
the expressive intent will still be distorted by the production.119 Therefore, 
labeling does not provide an effective remedy. 
Second, monetary damages could also provide a potential remedy. But 
defining the monetary value of the integrity of a work could be problematic. 
What would be appropriate compensation for altering a character’s racial 
identity in a way that destroyed the authorial expression? Additionally, as 
discussed above, scholars have shown that economic incentives may not spur 
artistic creativity nearly as much as certainty of control.120 Finally, this 
remedy may perversely cause a decrease in theatre companies choosing to 
produce scripts in which racial identity is central to expression for fear that 
they could not accurately cast the production.121 Imposing monetary damages 
as the appropriate remedy would likely increase this chilling effect. 
Given these limits of labeling and monetary remedies, injunctive relief 
appears to provide the best remedy for alterations to racial identity in 
violation of authorial expression. At least one commentator, Otto Konrad, 
argues that injunctions would not be appropriate for right of integrity 
violations in subsequent performances of dramatic works because of First 
Amendment constraints.122 Konrad’s concern centers on using injunctions to 
prohibit subsequent productions when the author disagrees with artistic, 
interpretive choices made by the production company.123 This Note suggests 
that such injunctions would only protect the right of integrity in casting and 
only in situations where character identity traits are central to authorial 
expression. This should obviate many of the First Amendment concerns 
Konrad raises regarding artistic interpretation. 
Moreover, injunctive relief would better align with authorial desire for 
control. Considering that creators may value control of their work more 
highly than economic benefits,124 injunctive relief better aligns with authors’ 
interests. Therefore, if authorial intent regarding racial identity in casting is 
worth protecting, injunctive relief would provide the most appropriate 
remedy. 
 
 119 However, as discussed infra Section IV.B, labeling may still provide an appropriate remedy in 
certain fair use situations. 
 120 See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which some artistic 
creators value control over their work and a continuing relationship with the work more than monetary 
compensation). 
 121 See infra Section IV.C. 
 122 See Konrad, supra note 22, at 1590 (“While injunctive relief may be available, such relief could 
create serious First Amendment difficulties and could be extremely destructive for the fragile 
entrepreneurial aspects of the performance art industry.”). 
 123 Id. 
 124 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
The proposal outlined above will likely raise several objections. This 
Part attempts to address some of the more salient challenges expected. 
Primarily, this Part will focus on three potential categories of objections: (1) 
application problems, such as how courts will identify when racial identity 
is central to expression; (2) First Amendment concerns that these restrictions 
might raise; and (3) the possibility that this proposal may restrict 
employment opportunities for minority actors. 
A. Application Difficulties 
Opponents of this Note’s proposal that the judiciary should “read in” a 
limited right of integrity into derivative works protections may argue that 
judges of law make poor judges of artistic expression. This has been a 
dominant thread in copyright law at least since Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.125 However, 
the proposed test would not force judges to engage in evaluating the merits 
of dramatic works, but rather would only require courts to distinguish 
between elements integral to “expression” and unprotected “idea” elements. 
While using expression as the key determination for when playwrights can 
legally protect racial identity in casting will inherently require courts to 
engage in line-drawing exercises, courts are already familiar with this type 
of distinction because they use the idea–expression dichotomy to determine 
copyrightable subject matter.126 Since the seminal case of Baker v. Selden in 
1879,127 courts have worked to distinguish between the idea presented by a 
copyrighted work and the expression of that idea. The upshot is, while the 
idea itself cannot be protected by copyright, the expression of that idea 
belongs exclusively to the copyright holder.128 
 
 125 See 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only 
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation . . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less 
educated than the judge.”). 
 126 See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” (emphasis added)); see also 4 MELVILLE NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19E.04[B] (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. rev. ed. 2009) 
(discussing the idea–expression dichotomy). 
 127 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 128 Id. at 100–01 (“Where the truths of a science or the methods of an art are the common property 
of the whole world, any author has the right to express the one, or explain and use the other, in his own 
way.”). 
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Moreover, the courts have repeatedly applied this test to dramatic 
works. In one of the most famous applications of the idea–expression 
dichotomy, Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 
examined whether the race of certain characters was part of the author’s 
expression and found that while the religion of the characters may have been 
part of that expression, their race was not central to the “main theme” of the 
work.129 While Judge Hand undertook this examination to determine whether 
the alleged infringer in the case had misappropriated the copyright holder’s 
expression,130 the type of analysis necessary to make such a finding would be 
substantially similar to the analysis required to find that the racial identity of 
the character is so central to authorial expression that it should be protected. 
Similarly, in Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System,131 the court examined whether a well-known character in a larger 
work, Sam Spade, was sufficiently “expressive” to be protectable or rather 
just an unprotectable “idea.” Dashiell Hammett entered into an agreement 
with Warner Bros., assigning the production company exclusive movie, 
radio, and television rights to Hammett’s book, The Maltese Falcon.132 
Hammett continued to write detective stories featuring Sam Spade, the 
protagonist of The Maltese Falcon.133 He then entered into agreements with 
other entertainment companies to produce radio dramas focused on the 
character of Sam Spade.134 Warner Bros. sued for copyright infringement, 
claiming that the exclusive rights agreement for The Maltese Falcon 
included exclusive media rights to the character Sam Spade.135 
While the Second Circuit ultimately found for Hammett due to the 
ambiguity of the contract with Warner Bros., Judge James Stephens 
discussed the viability of protecting fictional characters through copyright: 
“It is conceivable that the character really constitutes the story being told, 
but if the character is only the chessman in the game of telling the story he 
is not within the area of the protection afforded by the copyright.”136 
According to the court, in the case of The Maltese Falcon, the character of 
Sam Spade was merely the “vehicle[] for the story told,” and therefore an 
 
 129 45 F.2d 119, 121–22 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 130 Id. at 121. 
 131 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954). 
 132 Id. at 946. 
 133 Id. at 948. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 948–49. 
 136 Id. at 950. 
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unprotectable idea.137 Nichols and Warner Bros. both demonstrate that courts 
are no strangers to separating idea from expression. This same level of 
analysis could be used to evaluate the centrality of a character’s racial 
identity to the author’s overall expression. 
In fact, this type of analysis has continued to develop over the years and 
today courts regularly apply some type of idea–expression or abstraction-
filtration-comparison test to decide which elements of a copyrighted work 
are expressive enough to receive protection.138 While the application of these 
types of tests involve some element of subjective line drawing, the fact that 
courts engage with these questions already means that extending this analysis 
to racial identity in casting would not require judges to become more 
involved in subjective determinations than they already are. The change 
would be one of degree, not of kind. Instead of determining whether a 
fictional character is central enough to the story to be expressive, the courts 
would question whether the racial identity of the character is central to the 
story. 
Scholars have struggled to provide the most effective test for making 
these idea–expression distinctions,139 and while a fully fleshed out test is 
beyond the scope of this Note, one aspect of the test that applies specifically 
to determining whether racial identity is central to expression is: Whose 
perspective matters? If courts look at the centrality of racial identity to 
expression from the perspective of the author (who presumably would be the 
 
 137 Id. 
 138 The abstraction-filtration-comparison test is used primarily by the Second Circuit to decide 
whether an allegedly infringing work has infringed on protectable expression. The court applies “levels 
of abstraction” to the underlying work, filters out anything that is not protectable (such as an idea or 
something in the public domain) and then compares what is left of the underlying work with the allegedly 
infringing work to identify whether infringement has occurred. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–12 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to 
determine which elements of a software program were expressive and which were merely ideas). The 
Ninth Circuit employs an extrinsic/intrinsic test in order to filter out unprotectable ideas. See, e.g., 
Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ‘extrinsic test’ is an objective 
comparison of specific expressive elements . . . . The ‘intrinsic test’ is a subjective comparison that 
focuses on ‘whether the ordinary, reasonable audience’ would find the works substantially similar in the 
‘total concept and feel of the works.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & 
Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994))). While the abstraction-filtration-comparison test more 
clearly defines the steps involved, the goal is the same: to identify what is protectable expression and 
what is an unprotectable idea. 
 139 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197 (2016) 
(arguing that courts must focus on the underlying purpose of an intellectual property regime (such as 
copyright law) in order to properly distinguish between what is protected and what is not); see also 
Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA. L. REV. 1293 (2017) 
(discussing the similarly difficult line-drawing problem of how courts try to differentiate between 
aesthetic expression and functional utility across different areas of intellectual property law). 
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party bringing the suit), the court would be much more likely to find that 
identity protectable. If the court examines the question from the perspective 
of the reasonable audience member, it will likely grant protection less often. 
This creates additional potential line-drawing problems. 
But courts already deal with this question, for example, when deciding 
whether a work is “transformative” for purposes of a fair use defense.140 
Uniform agreement does not exist among courts as to whose perspective 
matters in determining expressive intent, but courts commonly look to either 
the reasonable audience member or the author/creator. 
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,141 for example, the Supreme 
Court found that 2 Live Crew’s use of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman was 
sufficiently transformative to be considered fair use primarily because the 
reasonable observer would not be confused by the parodic usage.142 On the 
other hand, in Blanch v. Koons,143 the Second Circuit focused on the 
subjective intent of the two artists in finding that the defendant’s use of the 
plaintiff’s photograph was transformative. While the plaintiff’s stated intent 
for her photograph was to “show some sort of an erotic sense” in an 
advertisement,144 the defendant claimed that he used a portion of the 
plaintiff’s work to “comment on the ways in which some of our most basic 
appetites—for food, play, and sex—are mediated by popular images.”145 
Citing these differences in the stated intent of the authors, the Second Circuit 
considered the defendant’s use transformative, and therefore not an 
infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright.146 
Because the right of integrity is about protecting authorial expression, 
it makes sense to consider the author’s viewpoint when deciding how central 
a character’s racial identity is to that expression. Indeed, countries with 
strong statutory protections for moral rights, such as Germany, tend to judge 
violations of integrity solely from the perspective of the creator.147 However, 
the Berne Convention requires that alterations must be “prejudicial to . . . the 
 
 140 For a fuller discussion of fair use, see infra Section IV.B. 
 141 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 142 Id. at 590–93. 
 143 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 144 Id. at 248. 
 145 Id. at 247. 
 146 Id. at 252 (“The sharply different objectives that Koons had in using, and Blanch had in creating, 
‘Silk Sandals’ confirms the transformative nature of the use.”). 
 147 Eric Marcus, The Moral Right of the Artist in Germany, 25 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 93, 102 (1975) 
(noting that German copyright law, for example, “grants the artist the right to prohibit any distortion . . . 
of his work which would prejudice his lawful intellectual or personal interests in the work” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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honor or reputation” of the artist, thereby introducing a quasi-reasonableness 
standard into the analysis.148 An author asserting a right of integrity claim 
under such a regime must show some type of objective harm to her honor or 
reputation and cannot based a claim solely on a subjective feeling of harm. 
Additionally, because this Note proposes modifying existing copyright 
structures to incorporate only a limited concept of the right of integrity into 
U.S. law, courts should consider both the perspective of the audience and the 
artist in order to avoid extending protections to scripts in which racial or 
gender identity is not central to authorial expression. By examining the stated 
subjective intent of the author and comparing that intent with what a 
reasonable observer would perceive, this approach would strike an 
appropriate balance between the need to protect authorial expression and the 
ability for future creators to produce the work. If the reasonable observer 
would more likely than not make the connection between a character’s racial 
identity and the author’s stated expressive intent, then that identity should be 
protectable. This amalgam of perspectives would help ensure that 
playwrights could only control subsequent casting when identity was truly 
central to the expression of the work, and thereby prevent overuse of the right 
of integrity. 
B. First Amendment Concerns 
Another objection critics might raise is that imposing legal restrictions 
on casting would infringe on the First Amendment rights of the theatre 
companies seeking to stage a work.149 But there are three issues with this 
criticism. First, as discussed above, such restrictions already exist when the 
author has sufficient bargaining power to impose casting requirements 
through contracts.150 Second, limiting the protections to situations where 
identity is central to the expression of the author will prevent overbroad 
applications of the protection. Finally, there may already be an answer to this 
dilemma in an existing component of copyright law: fair use doctrine.  
Section 107 of the Copyright Act allows courts to examine the way in 
which a copyrighted work is used and provides a complete defense to 
copyright infringement if the court considers the use “fair” after evaluating 
the following four factors: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
 
 148 Berne Convention, supra note 89. 
 149 See, e.g., Konrad, supra note 22, at 1608. 
 150 See supra Section II.B.2. 
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.151 
In recent years, courts have focused more and more on the first factor, “the 
purpose and character of the use,” and have read a requirement of 
“transformative” use into this factor.152 Courts could look to the 
transformative nature of changing racial identity through casting and, if a 
company shows a legitimate expressive interest in such a change, this could 
provide a valid fair use defense to a right of integrity action. 
Extending derivative rights protections to enable authorial control over 
casting, while at the same time expanding the fair use defense to protect the 
First Amendment rights of theatre practitioners, ultimately strikes a balance 
between overprotection and underprotection of the right of integrity. 
C. Restricting Casting Opportunities 
A final criticism is that right of integrity protections might limit the 
opportunities available for actors of color. But the proposal outlined above, 
while not unconnected to increasing diversity in theatre, is not designed to 
provide protection for actors of color. Rather, the goal of protecting racial 
identity in casting is to protect the expression of the playwright. Moral rights 
theories focus on the unique position of the author in connection to her 
work153 and would make poor vehicles for employment protections that 
would be better served through changes to labor and employment laws.154 
However, even keeping this distinction in mind, the concerns over the 
potential negative effects on employment opportunities for actors of color 
may be unfounded. For example, opponents might argue that additional 
 
 151 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 152 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that 
may weigh against a finding of fair use.”); see also supra notes 140–146 and accompanying text. 
 153 See Christopher Aide, A More Comprehensive Soul: Romantic Conceptions of Authorship and 
the Copyright Doctrine of Moral Right, 48 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 211, 212 (1990) (“With its 
insistence upon both identifying a work with its author and protecting an author’s honour, reputation and 
the integrity of an author’s work, the doctrine of moral right as expressed in current Canadian copyright 
law echoes many of the principles which infuse Romantic conceptions of authorship.”). 
 154 For proposals relating to the role of employment law in increasing diversity in casting, see, e.g., 
Robinson, supra note 19 (analyzing the legitimate role race should be allowed to play in casting decisions 
and advocating for the modification of Title VII to allow for such consideration); Bryant, supra note 19 
(similarly proposing extending the “bona fide occupational qualification” provision of Title VII to allow 
for considering race in hiring contexts such as casting). 
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statutory protections are unnecessary given the ability of playwrights to use 
production contracts to require certain casting provisions. But, as discussed 
above, contractual protections are insufficient to protect subsequent castings 
because of the limited bargaining power of most playwrights, meaning that 
even if these scripts are being produced, there will likely be no way to 
guarantee that the racial identity of the character is maintained.155 
Alternatively, this proposal may draw criticism because a legal 
requirement that subsequent productions of a play must maintain the racial 
identity of characters could persuade theatre companies drawing from 
smaller, less diverse actor pools to avoid staging a production subject to such 
a requirement. Adding an extra layer of statutory protections may deter 
theatre companies from producing the author’s work at all, thereby removing 
even the opportunity for an actor of color to play a character of the same 
racial identity. However, if the actor pool lacks the diversity necessary to 
perform a particular production, then it is unlikely that staging the production 
would result in more opportunities for racially diverse actors because the 
racial identity of the characters would not likely be preserved anyway. 
Furthermore, playwrights could still make contractual exceptions for 
productions in areas with bona fide claims of an inability to cast the 
production as written. 
Perhaps the most significant employment-based objection might be 
that, because the proposed protections focus on authorial expression, 
adopting this Note’s proposal could give power to playwrights to prevent 
“colorblind” casting of productions. For example, the estate of Arthur Miller 
could attempt to assert a right of integrity claim to prevent productions of 
Death of a Salesman from casting a black Willy Loman, claiming that 
Willy’s loss of white, male entitlement is part of the expression of the 
work.156 
While such a scenario might raise serious concerns, it is unlikely that 
such use of a right of integrity in casting identity would be the norm if courts 
were to adhere to a strict requirement that racial identity must be central to 
the expression of the author to be protected. For instance, in the Death of a 
Salesman example above, the author (or, in this case, his estate) would still 
have to show that Willy Loman’s racial identity is integral to the expressive 
intent of the author. Considering the universal themes of loss of self and loss 
of identity, this argument may not succeed. 
 
 155 See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 156 See generally ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN (1949). My thanks to David Lurie for 
providing this example. 
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But because of the subjective nature of this determination, it is possible 
that a court might come to the opposite conclusion and hold that Willy’s 
whiteness is central to Miller’s expressive intent. If courts were to make such 
findings consistently, this could result in a decrease in employment 
opportunities for actors of color. However, the “dual perspective” approach 
discussed in Section IV.A and the fair use defense as discussed in Section 
IV.B should help prevent erroneous findings that racial identity is central to 
expression. Nevertheless, under a strict application of the proposed test, there 
might be works for which maintaining a character’s racial identity will 
reduce the number of roles available to actors of color. While this concern is 
valid and solutions to this problem should be sought, such an inquiry is 
outside the scope of this Note, and copyright law, with its focus on the rights 
of authors, is a poor vehicle for addressing such inequalities. 
Finally, protecting racial identity when it is central to expression could 
very well result in a net increase in opportunities for actors of color because 
it might encourage playwrights to create works focusing on characters of 
color. If authors know that subsequent productions must maintain racial 
identity, they may be more inclined to tell stories in which a character’s racial 
identity is central to the work. Moreover, the sordid history of whitewashing 
in casting indicates that it is far more likely that actors of color will be 
deprived of roles in the absence of legal protections than that they will be 
denied opportunities if such protections were put in place.157 
CONCLUSION 
Current casting practices allow theatre companies to disregard authorial 
expression and intent regarding character identity far too easily. While this 
Note focuses on racial identity, a similar analysis could apply to gender 
identity as well, allowing playwrights to control gender identity in 
subsequent productions only when it is central to the expressive intent of the 
author. The moral rights concept of the right of integrity provides an 
appropriate mechanism for combating the problems plaguing the current 
system. 
While Congress could act and incorporate moral rights protections into 
U.S. copyright law, such action is unlikely. Additionally, such statutory 
provisions might not take casting practices into account given that this Note 
is the first to apply the right of integrity to casting. Therefore, courts should 
take Congress at its word and begin using existing copyright protections to 
enforce moral rights. An expansion of derivative rights protection could 
provide the type of legal protections this Note envisions. However, courts 
 
 157 See supra Part I. 
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would need to remain vigilant when hearing challenges to casting practices 
to ensure that the racial identity of the character is central to the expression 
of the author. Additionally, a more lenient understanding of what constitutes 
transformational use in the context of a fair use defense for casting practices 
could help ensure that deviating from authorial expression in casting would 
be justified in certain contexts. 
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